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Abstracts: This paper examines the feasibility of employing subsidy contracts as a control 
mechanism to optimise the mobile phone sales channel. We investigate a dual-channel that 
consists of a telecommunication service operator (TSO) and a mobile phone manufacturer 
(MPM). The MPM’s optimal production quantity and optimal retail price and the TSO’s 
optimal service capacity and optimal service price are derived in both the decentralised and 
centralised MPSC models. The modelling results show that the coordinated MPSC leads to 
profit increase for the MPSC as a whole. More importantly, our analysis demonstrates that a 
properly designed subsidy contract can achieve the channel coordination in the MPSC. 
However, such channel coordination through subsidy contract is subject to certain conditions 
in which Pareto improvement can be achieved. 
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1 Introduction  
Over the past two decades, the mobile telecommunication sector has witnessed a rapid growth 
in both developed and developing economies. The increase in the number of mobile phone 
users has led to the significant growth of mobile service. According to recent forecast, global 
mobile service revenue will reach the height of 1,137 billion U.S. dollars in 2015 (Informa 
Telecoms & Media, 2013). However, the increase of global mobile service revenue does not 
guarantee that each member within the mobile phone supply chain (MPSC) will gain more 
profit. In fact, intense competitiveness has already escalated the complexity of the strategic 
interactions among members within the MPSC. We have already seen many high profile 
winners and, of course, casualties in the mobile telecommunication sector. To meet the 
challenges, members in the MPSC can no longer compete as independent members. Instead, 
they must coordinate with each other and work towards a unified system to improve their 
supply chain performance.  
It is well known from the existing literature that channel coordination can improve the 
overall supply chain performance (Boyaci and Gallego 2004; Kanda and Deshmukh 2008). 
However, the main assumption ignores the competitive environment in which supply chain 
members operate. More importantly, MPSC is different from either traditional manufacturing 
supply chains or pure service supply chains. As a result, traditional supply chain theories may 
not be applicable. It is characterised in the following four aspects. (1) The main participating 
entities in the MPSC are telecommunication service operators (TSO), who provide the mobile 
telecommunication service, and mobile phone manufacturers (MPM), who produce mobile 
phones and product service. (2) In addition to the price and quality of mobile phones, both 
price and quality of telecommunication service complement each other and are essential to 
meet end customers’ needs. (3) There exists a dual-channel in the MPSC, in which consumers 
can buy their mobile phones and telecommunication services from either the MPM or the 
TSO directly. For example, consumers can buy iPhones and service packages from Apple 
stores or from different TSOs. (4) The MPM and the TSO can either compete with each other 
for market share or alternatively coordinate with each other in setting up the prices and then 
negotiate with each other in distributing profit through subsidy contact (Chen and Wang 
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2015).    
Given the inherent differences between the MPSC and the conventional manufacturing 
or service supply chains, we develop a model that links product and service prices to market 
demand and subsidy policies in a competitive market environment. More specifically, we 
consider the channel coordination problem in a MPSC that consists of an MPM and a TSO. 
The MPM can sell mobile phones to customers and the TSO can sell telecommunication 
service to customers respectively in a conventional supply chain or alternatively they can sell 
product and service bundled package to customers in a coordinated MPSC. Several questions 
are addressed in this article. They are listed as follows: 
(1) What are the MPM’s optimal production quantity and retail pricing policies and the 
TSO’s optimal service capacity and pricing policies in a decentralised or centralised MPSC 
respectively?  
(2) How to achieve supply chain coordination through subsidy contract and what is the 
effect of subsidy contract on MPSC decisions and its performance? 
(3) How to design a subsidy contract? For instance, what is the optimal subsidy and who 
are the provider and the receiver of the subsidy?  
(4) Under what conditions channel coordination through subsidy contract can achieve a 
win-win situation that MPSC members obtain a profit margin higher than they would do 
without contract?   
Although there is a considerable amount of research in the literature on different aspects 
of channel coordination, very few studies have focused on coordination in the service supply 
chain (Tsay and Agrawal 2000, Boyaci and Gallego 2004, Chan and Chan 2010, Liu et al. 
2013, Chen et al. 2015). Even fewer studies have made use of the mobile telecommunication 
sector as a case, which has distinctive supply chain characteristics as discussed earlier. It is 
important that the production economics research stream addresses the research gap through 
specifically designed modelling efforts. This paper aims at fulfilling this objective by 
modelling the channel coordination in the MPSC using the game theoretical approach. 
Generally speaking, in the game theory models, players make decisions to maximise their 
own utility, while taking into account that others are doing the same and that decisions made 
by players affect each other’s performance (Nagarajan and Sošić 2008). The main 
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contributions of our work are summarised as follows: 
 (1) We develop MPSC models with an MPM and a TSO in both decentralised and 
centralised supply chain structures, in which, both the MPM and the TSO directly deal with 
the end customers and their demand is influenced by the pricing policies of both the mobile 
phone product and telecommunication service. Our paper extends the traditional supply chain 
that consists of sequential upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer that mainly 
considers product or service only. 
(2)  Through examining the feasibility of using subsidy contract as a control mechanism 
to coordinate the MPSC, our research extends the exiting literature by demonstrating how 
such an approach can be employed practically to obtain a win-win outcome for the MPSC 
members.  
   (3) Through studying the channel coordination in the MPSC, we analyse the effect of 
channel coordination, pricing policies, and subsidy contract on the MPSC performance. The 
analysis results will support firms in the mobile telecommunication industry to adopt the 
proper strategies in order to improve their competitiveness.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to study the channel 
coordination problem of the MPSC, in which, both the MPM and the TSO use price and 
subsidy to compete and cooperate with each other to maximise their own profits. The 
remainder of this article is organised as follows. After a brief review of relevant literature in 
Section 2, modelling formulations and assumptions are provided in Section 3. In Section 4 
and 5 the optimal production quantity, optimal service capacity and pricing policies in a 
decentralised MPSC model and in a centralised MPSC model are presented respectively. In 
Section 6, we focus on how to achieve channel coordination through subsidy contract for the 
MPSC. In Section 7, some critical issues of channel coordination through subsidy contract are 
discussed. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications of our study and future work in 
Section 8. 
 
2 Literature review  
Channel coordination is an important issue in marketing and supply chain management. 
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Relevant studies on the coordination problem have been well reported in the literature. Other 
terms e.g. integration, collaboration, and cooperation are also used in the studies on channel 
coordination problems. These terms are complementary to each other and when used in the 
supply chain context can easily be considered as a part of supply chain channel coordination 
(Kanda and Deshmukh 2008). To highlight our contributions, only the literature that is 
representative and particularly relevant to our study is reviewed.  
The mobile phone industry has witnessed significant growth over the past two decades. 
Despite the importance to the economy and its unique features, studies on the MPSC are still 
rare in the operations and supply chain management literature. Among them, Catalan and 
Kotzab (2003) analysed the performance efficiency in the Danish MPSC and found its 
responsiveness was low. Their research emphasised the importance of the responsiveness and 
also suggested that collaboration between supply chain parties was crucial to improve the 
supply chain responsiveness. Eng (2006) provided some insights into the qualitative nature of 
mobile supply chain management but the research did not discuss the problems of the mobile 
phone industry. In addition, Eng (2006) mainly focused on the implications of mobile 
technology for supply chain management. Dedrick et al. (2011) analysed the distribution of 
value in the MPSC based on product-level data, and found that carriers and handset makers 
captured the most profit from each handset. Among the studies using quantitative approaches, 
Jiang et al. (2010) proposed an agent-based simulation approach to study the competitive and 
collaborative mechanisms for mobile service chains. Cricell et al. (2011) examined the 
competition among mobile network operators in the telecommunication supply chain focusing 
on different value chain components, the resulting competitive advantages and the appropriate 
value strategies. More recently, Chen and Wang (2015) investigated the free and bundled 
channels in the MPSC. Their research mainly focused on assessing the impact of supply chain 
power dynamics on the channel selection problem. Different to above mentioned studies, this 
research aims to derive optimal operations solutions for the MPSC members in both 
decentralised and centralised scenarios, and seeks a feasible mechanism to achieve the MPSC 
coordination which leads to our next wave of enquiry. 
Effective management of supply chains requires coordination among various channel 
members. According to Jeuland and Shugan (1983), channel coordination was defined as the 
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setting of all manufacturer and retailer-related decisions at the levels that would maximise 
total channel profits. The literature on supply chain coordination is rich including the studies 
on coordinating manufacturing supply chains (Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Ingene and Parry 
1995; Weng 1995; Iyer 1998; Tsay Agrawal 2004; Raju and Zhang 2005; Cai 2010) and the 
supply chain scenarios where service is considered (Ernst and Cohen 1992; Tsay and Arrawal 
2000; Boyaci and Gallego 2004; Li et al. 2011; Chen and Shen 2012; and Liu et al. 2013). 
Different coordination mechanisms including quantity discount (Jeuland and Shugan 1983; 
Weng 1995; Raju and Zhang 2005), two-part tariff pricing policies (Ingene and Parry 1995; 
Raju and Zhang 2005; Swami and Shah 2013), pricing discount (Li et al. 2011), revenue 
sharing (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo 2004; Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Xiao et al. 2011; 
Zhou and Wang 2012), and option contracts (Zhao et al. 2010; Chen and Shen 2012) have been 
discussed as alternative mechanisms to coordinate different supply chain scenarios. 
Nevertheless, none of the above research has studied the coordination in the context of the 
MPSC, which is different from conventional manufacturing or service supply chain as we 
discussed earlier.  
One key question is how to design a subsidy contract which can coordinate the MPSC 
and improve its performance, which is closely related to another stream of research that 
centres on supply chain coordination with contracts and contract negotiation. To develop a 
better understanding of the coordination issues, Kanda and Deshmukh (2008) conducted a 
systematic review which reports and reviews various perspectives on supply chain 
coordination. Their study also tried to understand and appreciate various mechanisms e.g. 
supply chain contracts, joint decision making, information technology, and information 
sharing that were available for coordination. Pasternack (1985) showed that buy-back 
contracts can achieve supply chain coordination. Taylor (2002) studied the supply chain 
coordination under sales-rebate contracts with sales effort effects. His research findings 
showed that a properly designed target rebate and returns contract achieves supply chain 
coordination and a win-win outcome when demand was influenced by retailer’s sales effort. 
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) proposed a supply chain revenue sharing contract model 
for a three-stage supply chain, and demonstrated that the mechanism could achieve the system 
efficiency and improve the profits of all the supply chain parties. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) 
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also investigated revenue-sharing contracts in a two-echelon supply chain model with 
revenues determined by each retailer's purchase price and quantity, and demonstrated that 
revenue sharing could coordinate a supply chain with a price-setting newsvendor. Xiao et al. 
(2011) investigated coordination of a two-echelon supply chain via a revenue-sharing contract, 
in which a product quality assurance policy was provided and customer demand was sensitive 
to product quality, service quality and retail price. Zhou and Wang (2012) considered a supply 
chain coordination issue for newsvendor-type products with two ordering opportunities in a 
two-echelon supply chain. They proposed an improved revenue-sharing contract that could 
achieve perfect supply chain coordination. Ma et al. (2013) examined supply chain 
coordination issues between a retailer and a manufacturer where the market demand dependent 
on the retail price, the retailer's marketing effort, and the manufacturer's quality effort. Based on 
two-part tariff contract and cost sharing contract, they developed an effective contract to 
coordinate supply chain. Swami and Shah (2013) investigated the channel coordination in 
green supply chain management. In addition to the finding that profits were higher in the 
coordinated channel as compared to the case of the decentralised channel, their study also 
showed that a two-part tariff contract produced channel coordination in this problem. 
Nevertheless, among the existing literature on channel coordination with contracts, very few 
studies have considered subsidy contract as an effective control mechanism for supply chain 
coordination although it is a very common practice in the telecommunication sector.  
Furthermore, although supply chain coordination often leads to improved supply chain 
performance collectively as demonstrated in previous research, it is not necessary that supply 
chain parties are willing to be coordinated if individual companies will be worse off through 
the coordination. For instance, Boyaci and Gallego (2004) used game-theoretical concepts to 
model customer service competition considering a market with two competing supply chains. 
Through the comparison of three competition scenarios, their research found that although 
coordination was a dominant strategy for the two competing supply chains, both of them were 
often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario while 
the consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiary of coordination. Iyer (1998) studied how 
manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price and 
other important non-price factors. The research finding showed that a channel in which one 
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manufacturer chose to be coordinated while the other chose to be non-coordinated can be 
equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty. Cai (2010) investigated the influence of four 
supply chain structures with and without coordination on the supplier and the retailer. Their 
finding suggested that the channel selection and coordination preferences depend on 
parameters like channel base demand, channel, operational cost, and channel substitutability. 
Supply chain members would only take part in the coordination if Pareto improvement could 
be achieved (Zhao et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011). Therefore it is important to understand the 
conditions under which a win-win situation can be achieved through subsidy contract in the 
context of the MPSC.  
This paper focuses on the coordination issues of the MPSC. Compared with the literature 
on supply chain coordination models, the critical difference of this paper does not only lie in 
the developed coordination model for the MPSC but also the analytical exploration of the 
issues concerning implementation of pricing policies and subsidy contracts in the MPSC, 
taking into account the unique characteristic of the MPSC. Different from most of 
two-echelon sequential supply chains, members in the MPSC deal with the end customers 
directly, and therefore customer demand is influenced by the prices of both the mobile phone 
and the telecom service. Different to the retail operation for complementary products/services 
where the price and quantity decisions of product and service are made by retailers, the same 
decisions on product and service are made by the manufacturer and the service provider 
respectively. Furthermore, the sequences of these decisions are different in the MPSC. These 
unique characteristics of this industry require particular modelling changes and these changes 
will lead to some new results.   
 
3 Model Formulation and Assumptions 
We consider a MPSC that consists of a telecom service operator (TSO) and a mobile phone 
manufacturer (MPM). For each mobile phone, the MPM’s unit retail price is 𝑝𝑚, and its unit 
manufacturing cost is 𝑐𝑚. The TSO’s revenue from one customer over the service period is 
𝑝o, and its unit service cost over the service period is 𝑐𝑜.  
Without considering subsidy contract, mobile phone sale is the only source of revenue 
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for the MPM, and service revenue is the only source for the TSO. Considering subsidy, in 
addition to the mobile phone sales revenue, the MPM can get a second revenue source 
through the subsidy 𝜃 (0 < 𝜃 < 𝑝𝑜) from the TSO or alternatively incur a cost through 
giving subsidy 𝜃 (−𝑝𝑚 < 𝜃 < 0) to the TSO. At the same time, in addition to the service 
revenue, the TSO can get a second revenue source through the subsidy 𝜃 (−𝑝𝑚 < 𝜃 < 0) 
from the MPM or alternatively incur a cost through giving subsidy 𝜃 (0 < 𝜃 < 𝑝𝑜) to the 
MPM. 
Similar to the conventional demand function, demand is defined by the equation 𝑝𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑜 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , where 𝛼𝑖  denotes the maximum unit retail price of 
mobile phone/telecom service 𝑖 , 𝛽  is the demand sensitivity, 𝛾  is the cross-demand 
sensitivity. The demand is assumed to be deterministic, so the demand equals to the quantity 
sold by the firm. In addition, the demand 𝑖 is influenced by the firm 𝑖’s retail price and firm 
𝑗’s retail price. Then in the inverse demand function, the price 𝑖 is dependent on the quantity 
sold by firm 𝑖 and the quantity sold by firm 𝑗. Through the inversion of price and quantity, 
the objective functions for both parties are concave and hence the optimal decisions can be 
found with basic algebra. We assume 𝛽 > 𝛾 > 0, which appears reasonable because mobile 
phone price is relatively more sensitive to mobile phone demand than telecom service demand. 
Although the assumption of a simple demand function has its limitations, this linear inverse 
demand function has been often used in operations management (de Mesnard, 2009 and 2011; 
Shin and Tunca, 2010; Chen et al. 2012; Shang et al. 2015) as well as marketing research 
(Ingene et al., 1995; Padmanabhan et al., 1997).  
The relationship between mobile phone and telecom operator service is complementary, 
then we assume that eventual sales quantities of mobile phones and telecom service contracts 
are the same although each party will get different optimal quantities (𝑞𝑚, 𝑞𝑜) according to 
the demand function. We also define ∆𝑚= 𝛼𝑚 − 𝑐𝑚, which means maximum possible unit 
profit of mobile phone; and define ∆𝑜= 𝛼𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜, which means maximum possible unit profit 
of telecom service.  
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4 Decentralised MPSC  
In a decentralised MPSC, non-cooperative game theory is applied, in which the manufacturer 
and the operator are rational and self-interested. More specifically, each aims to maximise its 
own profit. In addition, a Nash game is used to model the MPSC as it is assumed to have a 
balanced power structure between the manufacturer and the operator. In the Nash game, both 
players make the decision simultaneously, where the MPM decides its mobile phone retail 
price and the TSO decides its service price according to the customer demand. After the 
customer demand is realised, the MPM gains its mobile phone sales revenue and the TSO 
gains its service revenue.  
The MPM’s profit in a decentralised MPSC, denoted 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞), is 
𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞) = 𝑝𝑚𝑞 − 𝑐𝑚𝑞  (1) 
The first term is total sales revenue and the second term is total manufacturing cost. Then 
𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞]𝑞 (2) 
The TSO’s profit in a decentralised MPSC, denoted 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞), is 
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞) = 𝑝𝑜𝑞 − 𝑐𝑜𝑞 (3) 
The first term is total service revenue and the second term is total service cost. Then 
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞) = [∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞]𝑞𝑜 (4) 
As to the MPM’s optimal production quantity (𝑞𝑚) and optimal retail price (𝑝𝑚), and 
TSO’s optimal service capacity (𝑞𝑜) and optimal service price (𝑝𝑜) in a decentralised MPSC, 
the following proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 1 In a decentralised MPSC model, 𝒒𝒎 =
∆𝒎
𝟐(𝜷+𝜸)
, 𝒒𝒐 =
∆𝑜
𝟐(𝜷+𝜸)
, 𝒑𝒎 =
𝜶𝒎+𝒄𝒎
𝟐
 and 𝒑𝒐 =
𝜶𝒐+𝒄𝒐
𝟐
. 
This proposition means that in a decentralised MPSC, the MPM’s optimal production 
quantity and the TSO’s optimal service capacity exist, which are decided by their maximum 
possible unit profits, the demand sensitivity, and the cross-demand sensitivity. That is, both 
the MPM’s optimal production quantity and TSO’s optimal service capacity increase in their 
maximum possible unit profits, and decrease in the demand sensitivity and the cross-demand 
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sensitivity. In a decentralised MPSC, the MPM’s optimal retail price and TSO’s optimal 
service price exist. Both the MPM’s optimal retail price and TSO’s optimal service price 
increase in their maximum unit retail price and unit manufacturer/service cost. 
The relationship between mobile phone and telecom service is complementary. Therefore 
the actual sale quantity for both mobile phone and telecom service, denoted 𝑞𝑓, is 𝑞𝑓 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑞𝑚, 𝑞𝑜). Then MPM’s profit in a decentralised MPSC is 
𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑓]𝑞𝑓 (5) 
The TSO’s profit in a decentralised MPSC is 
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) = [∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑓]𝑞𝑓 (6) 
 
5 Centralised MPSC 
In a centralised MPSC, the MPM and the TSO jointly make the decision to optimise the 
overall profit of the MPSC. The decision problem faced by central controller is to decide the 
mobile phone retail price and the telecom service price according to the customer demand, q. 
The profit for the centralised MPSC, denoted 𝜋𝐼(𝑞), is 
𝜋𝐼(𝑞) = (𝑝𝑚 − 𝑐𝑚)𝑞 + (𝑝𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜)𝑞 (7) 
The first part is the profit of mobile phone and the second term is the profit of telecom 
service. Then 
𝜋𝐼(𝑞) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑓]𝑞 + [∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑓]𝑞 (8) 
As the central controller’s optimal production/service capacity (𝑞𝐼), optimal retail price 
(𝑝𝑚
𝐼 ) and optimal service price (𝑝𝑜
𝐼 ), the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 2 In a centralised MPSC, 𝒒𝑰 =
∆𝒎+∆𝒐
𝟒(𝜷+𝜸)
, 𝒑𝒎
𝑰 =
𝟑𝜶𝒎+𝒄𝒎−∆𝒐
𝟒
 and 𝒑𝒐
𝑰 =
𝟑𝜶𝒐+𝒄𝒐−∆𝒎
𝟒
. 
This proposition means that in a centralised MPSC, the central controller’s optimal 
production/service capacity exists, which is decided by their maximum possible unit profits, 
the demand sensitivity and the cross-demand sensitivity. That is, the central controller’s 
optimal production/service capacity increases in both the maximum possible unit profit of 
mobile phone and the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service, and decreases in both 
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the demand sensitivity and the cross-demand sensitivity. It is interesting to see that 𝑞𝐼 is the 
mean of 𝑞𝑚 and 𝑞𝑜. This can be explained by the fact that both the maximum possible unit 
profits (∆𝑚  and ∆𝑜) of the MPM and the TSO affect the central controller’s optimal 
production/service capacity and their effect on 𝑞𝐼 is equally distributed in a supply chain 
where the MPM and the TSO are assumed to have a balanced power relationship. Moreover, 
in a centralised MPSC, the central controller’s optimal mobile phone retail price and optimal 
service price exist. That is, the central controller’s optimal mobile phone retail price increases 
in both her maximum unit retail price and her unit manufacturer cost, and decreases in the 
maximum possible unit profit of telecom service; the central controller’s optimal service price 
increases in both her maximum unit retail price and her unit service cost, and decreases in the 
maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone. Then, the centralised MPSC’s profit is 
𝜋𝐼(𝑞𝐼) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
8(𝛽+𝛾)
 (9) 
From proposition 1 and proposition 2, we can directly obtain that the decentralised 
MPSC cannot be coordinated. To achieve channel coordination, we will introduce subsidy 
contract to the MPSC in the next section. 
 
6 MPSC with Subsidy Contract 
Similar to the decentralised model, a non-cooperative Nash game is applied to model the 
MPSC considering subsidy contract. The sequence of events is as follows. Firstly, the TSO 
negotiates the subsidy with the MPM. Then the MPM decides its mobile phone retail price 
and the TSO decides its service price simultaneously according to the customer demand and 
the subsidy. Finally, when the customer demand is realised, the MPM and the TSO gain their 
revenues respectively. Considering subsidy contract, if the TSO gives subsidy to the MPM, 
then the MPM has two revenue sources: mobile phone sales revenue and subsidy from the 
TSO. The TSO has additional cost which is the subsidy to the MPM. On the other hand, if the 
MPM gives subsidy to the TSO, then the TSO has two revenue sources: service sales revenue 
and subsidy from the MPM. The MPM has additional cost, which is the subsidy to the TSO. 
The relationship between the mobile phone and telecom service is complementary and 
bundled.  
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In a MPSC with subsidy contract, the MPM’s profit, denoted 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞), is 
𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞) = 𝑝𝑚𝑞 − 𝑐𝑚𝑞 + 𝜃𝑞  (10) 
The first term is the total sale revenue of mobile phone. The second term is the total 
manufacturing cost. And the last term represents the subsidy from/to the TSO. Then 
𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + 𝜃]𝑞  (11) 
The TSO’s profit in a MPSC with subsidy contract, denoted 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞), is 
𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞) = 𝑝𝑜𝑞 − 𝑐𝑜𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞 (12) 
The first term is the service revenue of telecom service. The second term is the total 
service cost. And the last term represents the subsidy to/from the MPM. Then 
𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞) = [∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 − 𝜃]𝑞 (13) 
As to the MPM’s optimal production quantity (𝑞𝑏) and optimal retail price (𝑝𝑚
𝑏 ), the 
TSO’s optimal service capacity (𝑞𝑏) and optimal service price (𝑝𝑜
𝑏), and the optimal subsidy 
(𝜃𝑏) in a MPSC with subsidy contract, the following proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 3 In a MPSC model with subsidy contract, 𝒒𝒃 =
∆𝒎+∆𝒐
𝟒(𝜷+𝜸)
, 𝒑𝒎
𝒃 =
𝟑𝜶𝒎+𝒄𝒎−∆𝒐
𝟒
, 
𝒑𝒐
𝒃 =
𝟑𝜶𝒐+𝒄𝒐−∆𝒎
𝟒
 and 𝜽𝒃 =
∆𝒐−∆𝒎
𝟐
. 
The proposition means that in a MPSC with subsidy contract, the MPM’s optimal 
production quantity and TSO’s optimal service capacity exist. Both the MPM’s optimal 
production quantity and TSO’s optimal service capacity increase in both the maximum 
possible unit profit of mobile phone and the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service, 
and decrease in both the demand sensitivity and cross-demand sensitivity. The MPM’s 
optimal sale price and the TSO’s optimal service price exist. The MPM’s optimal sale price 
increases in both her maximum unit retail price and her unit manufacturer cost, and decreases 
in the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service; the TSO’s optimal service price 
increases in both her maximum unit retail price and her unit service cost, and decreases in the 
maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone. The optimal subsidy also exists and is decided 
by the relationship between the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone and the 
maximum possible unit profit of telecom service. If the maximum possible unit profit of 
telecom service is higher than the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone, then the TSO 
should give subsidy to the MPM. On the other hand, if the maximum possible unit profit of 
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telecom service is lower than the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone, then the 
MPM should give subsidy to the TSO. 
The MPM’s profit in a MPSC with subsidy contract is 
𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
 (14) 
The TSO’s profit in a MPSC with subsidy contract is 
𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
 (15) 
From proposition 2 and proposition 3, we can directly gain the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 In a MPSC with subsidy contract, the MPSC can be coordinated with 
the optimal subsidy 𝜽𝒃 =
∆𝒐−∆𝒎
𝟐
. 
This proposition means that in a MPSC with subsidy contact, the MPSC can be 
coordinated with certain condition. 
 
7 Discussions 
In this section, we will discuss the effect of subsidy on the MPSC’s decisions and profits. As 
to the effect of subsidy on the MPSC’s optimal quantity, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 5 If ∆𝒎≥ ∆𝒐, then 𝒒
𝒃 ≤ 𝒒𝒎, 𝒑𝒎
𝒃 ≥ 𝒑𝒎, 𝒒𝒃 ≥ 𝒒𝒐 and 𝒑𝒐
𝒃 ≤ 𝒑𝒐; if ∆𝒎<
∆𝒐, then  𝒒
𝒃 > 𝒒𝒎, 𝒑𝒎
𝒃 < 𝒑𝒎, 𝒒𝒃 < 𝒒𝒐, and 𝒑𝒐
𝒃 > 𝒑𝒐. 
The proposition means that if the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone is higher 
than the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service, then the MPM’s optimal production 
quantity in a MPSC with subsidy contract is less than that without subsidy contract and the 
TSO’s optimal telecom service capacity with subsidy contract is more than that without 
subsidy contract. The MPM’s optimal retail price in a MPSC with subsidy contract is higher 
than that without subsidy contract and the TSO’s optimal telecom service price with subsidy 
contract is lower than that without subsidy contract. If the maximum possible unit profit of 
mobile phone is higher than the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service, then the 
MPM’s optimal production quantity in a MPSC with subsidy contract is more than that 
without subsidy contract and the TSO’s optimal telecom service capacity with subsidy 
contract is less than that without subsidy contract. The MPM’s optimal retail price in a MPSC 
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with subsidy contract is lower than that without subsidy contract and the TSO’s optimal 
telecom service price with subsidy contract is higher than that without subsidy contract. 
As to the effect of subsidy on the MPSC’s profit, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 6 If ∆𝒎 − ∆𝒐> 𝟒∆𝒐  or ∆𝒐 − ∆𝒎> 𝟒∆𝒎 , then 𝝅𝒎
𝒃 (𝒒𝒃) > 𝝅𝒎
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇) and 
𝝅𝒐
𝒃(𝒒𝒃) > 𝝅𝒐
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇) ; if 𝟎 < ∆𝒎 − ∆𝒐≤ 𝟒∆𝒐 , then 𝝅𝒎
𝒃 (𝒒𝒃) ≤ 𝝅𝒎
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇)  and 𝝅𝒐
𝒃(𝒒𝒃) ≥
𝝅𝒐
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇); if 𝟎 ≤ ∆𝒐 − ∆𝒎≤ 𝟒∆𝒎, then 𝝅𝒐
𝒃(𝒒𝒃) ≤ 𝝅𝒐
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇) and 𝝅𝒎
𝒃 (𝒒𝒃) ≥ 𝝅𝒎
𝒇
(𝒒𝒇). 
From this proposition, we know that if the gap between the maximum possible unit profit 
of mobile phone and the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service is four times higher 
than the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone or the maximum possible unit profit of 
telecom service, then both the MPM and the TSO will gain more profit in a MPSC with 
subsidy contract than that without subsidy contract. That is, the MPSC will achieve Pareto 
improvement with subsidy contract. In this scenario, both the MPM and the TSO are willing 
to accept subsidy contract and the MPSC can be coordinated. On the other hand, if the gap 
between the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone and the maximum possible unit 
profit of telecom service is lower than or equal to four times of the maximum possible unit 
profit of mobile phone or the maximum possible unit profit of telecom service, then the MPM 
or the TSO will gain less profit in a MPSC with subsidy contract than that without subsidy 
contract. That is, the MPSC will not obtain a win-win situation with subsidy contract. In this 
scenario, the MPM or the TSO are unwilling to accept subsidy contract and the MPSC cannot 
be coordinated. 
   The mobile phone industry is one of the fastest growing sectors yet to receive much 
academic attention. It is also a competitive marketplace, in which we witnessed some 
dramatic rises and falls of high profile companies. In addition to technological advancement 
and innovations, mobile phone manufacturers and telecom service operators have 
opportunities to improve their profitability by employing right pricing strategies via 
coordinating the MPSC. Our research findings provide important managerial and practical 
implications to firms in the mobile phone industry. More specifically, our findings enable the 
MPM and the TSO to derive the optimal decisions on the production quantity, service 
capacity, and prices, in both the decentralised and centralised MPSC. Secondly, our findings 
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do not only demonstrate subsidy contract as an effective mechanism for achieving the MPSC 
coordination, but also provide firms in the MPSC a useful guideline to design a practical 
subsidy contract that brings benefits to both the MPM and the TSO collectively as well as 
individually. In addition, our research identifies the conditions, under which, the Pareto 
improvement can be achieved for the MPSC. Many firms are simply unware that the MPSC 
cannot be coordinated under certain conditions since the MPSC members’ economic 
performance may be worse off individually although the overall profit increases for the whole 
MPSC. Our findings will support firms in this competitive industry to adopt the right 
strategies and make appropriate operational decisions to improve their competitiveness. 
 
8 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
In this article, we propose a model of the MPSC that represents the interaction between final 
consumers, a MPM and a TSO, taking into account the distinctive features of the MPSC in 
which both the manufacturer and the service provider can use prices and subsidy contract to 
compete and cooperate with each other. We address the issue of supply chain channel 
management between a MPM and a TSO where the market demand is influenced by the 
MPM’s product price and the TSO’s service price. We derive the MPM’s optimal production 
quantity and optimal retail price and the TSO’s optimal service capacity and optimal service 
price in both decentralised and centralised MPSCs. We explore analytically the issues 
concerning implementation of the subsidy contract as channel coordination mechanism. Our 
analysis results show that the MPSC can be coordinated through subsidy contract and it 
increases the profit of the MPSC as a whole. However, such channel coordination is subject to 
the difference between the maximum possible unit profit of mobile phone and the maximum 
possible unit profit of telecom service. Only when the profit difference between the two 
increases to a certain level, the MPSC can be coordinated and achieve Pareto improvement 
through subsidy contract.  
The mobile telecommunication sector has unique supply chain features that are different 
from traditional manufacturing supply chains or service supply chains. It is mainly reflected 
in three aspects: (i) the nature of demand, (ii) the decision maker, and (iii) the sequence of 
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decisions. First, different to most of two-echelon sequential supply chains, both the MPM and 
the TSO directly deal with the end customers. Therefore, customer demand is influenced by 
the prices of both the mobile phone product and telecom service. Second, different to the 
traditional retailing operation for complementary products/services where the price and 
quantity decisions of product and service are made by retailer, the MPM makes the decision 
for the price and quantity of the mobile product and the TSO makes the decision for the price 
and quantity of the service contract respectively. Third, different to other two-echelon supply 
chains e.g. retailing or manufacturing where the price/quantity decisions are often made in 
sequence by supply chain members, the decisions are simultaneously made by the MPM and 
the TSO in the decentralised MPSC or the decentralised MPSC with subsidy contract. 
It is also the industry sector that subsidy contract is extensively implemented to increase 
the sales of mobile phones and telecom services. In a MPSC, a subsidy contract can be a 
two-way payment between the MPSC members. For instance, in addition to the retail sales 
price of a mobile phone product, a TSO pays MPM a percentage of the revenue generated 
from its mobile telecom service as subsidy, or in an opposite way, a MPM pays TSO a 
percentage of the revenue generated from its mobile phone sales as subsidy. Therefore, it is 
different to other popular control mechanisms used in the channel coordination e.g. channel 
rebate contract (Taylor 2002) or revenue sharing contract (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). 
Despite the uniqueness of its retail channel structure and the extensive use of subsidy contract 
in the mobile telecommunication industry, little academic literature has examined this 
important problem in a similar setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of 
the channel coordination and subsidy contract problem using the case of the MPSC. The 
analyses of this paper indicate the following insights. 
Mobile phone manufacturers and telecom service operators have an opportunity to 
improve profitability further by better coordinated supply chain channel since the coordinated 
MPSC leads to profit increase for the supply chain as a whole. The optimal decisions on 
production quantity, service capacity, pricing, and subsidy are dependent on the maximum 
possible unit profit of mobile phone and telecom service, the demand sensitivity, and the 
cross-demand sensitivity. Our analysis also demonstrates that a properly designed subsidy 
contract can achieve the coordination of the MPSC. Interestingly, the channel coordination 
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through subsidy contract is only practical in the certain condition under that MPSC members 
obtain a level of profit no less than the profit they would gain without subsidy contract. This 
finding supports the view of Ingene and Parry (2000) that channel coordination should no 
longer be regarded as the ultimate goal, which supply chain managers should uncritically 
pursue because supply chain members are ultimately interested in their own profitability. 
Other factors beyond those we have considered may also influence the decision to offer 
subsidy contract between supply chain members. For instance, even for those conditions that 
an MPM or a TSO will obtain a profit margin lower than they would do without subsidy 
contract, some firms may still choose to sacrifice a short-term profit decrease and to be 
bundled with a dominant player through subsidy contract in order to build a strategic 
partnership with a dominant MPSC member and increase their market share for long-term 
growth. Furthermore, in case of complements (say, mobile telecom service and home 
broadband), the TSO may discount the mobile telecom service offered under subsidy contract 
to spur sales of the other service e.g. home broadband. We leave these issues to be considered 
for future research.   
Similar to any other model published in the literature, the present model is also based on 
some assumptions. For example, our model assumes that the MPSC consisted of one MPM 
and one TSO with deterministic demand. This specific configuration of a supply chain enables 
researchers to model supply chain decisions and draw interesting insights from the analysis. 
One important extension of this work is to include stochastic demand and consider multiple 
MPMs and multiple TSOs in the model. Such an extension will be interesting and require a 
new set of models. Furthermore, the number of mobiles sold on the market and the number of 
contracts are assumed to be the same. In fact, many people keep their contracts over years but 
change the mobile every year. Although it is less common, some people keep their mobile 
phones over years but change or renew contract every year, which also lead to the difference 
in the numbers of mobile phones and service contacts. One future research direction is to 
incorporate the other two market scenarios in modelling the MPSC. Another research 
direction is to examine the impacts of product quality and service quality on the optimal 
pricing and channel coordination strategies. Moreover, this study can also be applied to other 
technology and service industries which share similar characteristics of the MPSC. It is a 
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more challenging research topic if these extensions are incorporated in the model, but could 
certainly provide more useful insights. We believe the ideas and models presented in this 
research lay the inspirational ground for future research in these avenues. 
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Appendix   
Proof of Proposition 1 
From (2), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= −(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + ∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = ∆𝑚 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞2  
=
−2(𝛽 + 𝛾) < 0, so 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞) is concave in 𝑞. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= 0, we get ∆𝑚 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = 0. 
Then 𝑞𝑚 =
∆𝑚
2(𝛽+𝛾)
. So, 𝑝𝑚 = 𝛼𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑚 =
𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚
2
, that is, 𝑝𝑚 =
𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚
2
. 
Similarly, from (4), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= −(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + ∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = ∆𝑜 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 
and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞2  
= −2(𝛽 + 𝛾) < 0, so 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞) is concave in 𝑞. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= 0, we get ∆𝑜 −
2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = 0. Then 𝑞𝑜 =
∆𝑜
2(𝛽+𝛾)
. So, 𝑝𝑜 = 𝛼𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑜 =
𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜
2
, that is, 𝑝𝑜 =
𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜
2
. 
23 
 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From (8), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝐼(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= −2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + ∆𝑚 + ∆𝑜 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = ∆𝑚 + ∆𝑜 − 4(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞, 
𝑑2𝜋𝐼(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞2
= −4(𝛽 + 𝛾) < 0, so 𝜋𝐼(𝑞) is concave in 𝑞. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝐼(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= 0, we get ∆𝑚 + ∆𝑜 −
4(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 = 0. That is, 𝑞𝐼 =
∆𝑚+∆𝑜
4(𝛽+𝛾)
. Then, 𝑝𝑚
𝐼 = 𝛼𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝐼 =
3𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚−∆𝑜
4
 and 𝑝𝑜
𝐼 =
𝛼𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝐼 =
3𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜−∆𝑚
4
. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From (11), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= −(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + ∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + 𝜃 = ∆𝑚 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + 𝜃 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞2
= −2(𝛽 + 𝛾) < 0 . So, 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞) is concave in 𝑞 . Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= 0 , we get ∆𝑚 −
2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + 𝜃 = 0. Then 𝑞𝑏 =
∆𝑚+𝜃
2(𝛽+𝛾)
. 
Similarly, from (13), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= −(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 + ∆𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 − 𝜃 = ∆𝑜 − 2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 −
𝜃 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞2
= −2(𝛽 + 𝛾) < 0, so 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞) is concave in 𝑞. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
= 0, we get ∆𝑜 −
2(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞 − 𝜃 = 0. Then 𝑞𝑏 =
∆𝑜−𝜃
2(𝛽+𝛾)
.  
Let 
∆𝑚+𝜃
2(𝛽+𝛾)
=
∆𝑜−𝜃
2(𝛽+𝛾)
, we get 𝜃𝑏 =
∆𝑜−∆𝑚
2
, then 𝑞𝑏 =
∆𝑚+∆𝑜
4(𝛽+𝛾)
. Then, 𝑝𝑚
𝑏 = 𝛼𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑏 =
3𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚−∆𝑜
4
 and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 = 𝛼𝑜 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑏 =
3𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜−∆𝑚
4
. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
From proposition 1 and proposition 3, we get 𝑞𝑏 − 𝑞𝑚 =
∆𝑚+∆𝑜
4(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑚
2(𝛽+𝛾)
=
∆𝑜−∆𝑚
4(𝛽+𝛾)
, 𝑝𝑚
𝑏 −
𝑝𝑚 =
3𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚−∆𝑜
4
−
𝛼𝑚+𝑐𝑚
2
=
∆𝑚−∆𝑜
4
, 𝑞𝑏 − 𝑞𝑜 =
∆𝑚+∆𝑜
4(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝒐
2(𝛽+𝛾)
=
∆𝑚−∆𝑜
4(𝛽+𝛾)
, and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 − 𝑝𝑜 =
3𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜−∆𝑚
4
−
𝛼𝑜+𝑐𝑜
2
=
∆𝑜−∆𝑚
4
.Then, if ∆𝑚≥ ∆𝑜 , then 𝑞
𝑏 − 𝑞𝑚 ≤ 0 , 𝑝𝑚
𝑏 − 𝑝𝑚 ≥ 0 , 𝑞𝑏 −
𝑞𝑜 ≥ 0, and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 − 𝑝𝑜 ≤ 0. That is, 𝑞𝑏 ≤ 𝑞𝑚, 𝑝𝑚
𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝑚, 𝑞𝑏 ≥ 𝑞𝑜 and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 ≤ 𝑝𝑜; if ∆𝑚< ∆𝑜, 
then 𝑞𝑏 − 𝑞𝑚 > 0 , 𝑝𝑚
𝑏 − 𝑝𝑚 < 0 , 𝑞𝑏 − 𝑞𝑜 < 0  and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 − 𝑝𝑜 > 0 . That is, 𝑞𝑏 > 𝑞𝑚 , 
𝑝𝑚
𝑏 < 𝑝𝑚, 𝑞𝑏 < 𝑞𝑜, and 𝑝𝑜
𝑏 > 𝑝𝑜. This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
From proposition 1, we get 𝑞𝑚 − 𝑞𝑜 =
∆𝑚
2(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑜
2(𝛽+𝛾)
=
∆𝑚−∆𝑜
2(𝛽+𝛾)
. 
(i) If ∆𝑚> ∆𝑜, then 𝑞
𝑚 ≥ 𝑞𝑜, that is, 𝑞𝑓 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑞𝑚, 𝑞𝑜) = 𝑞𝑜. Then MPM’s profit in a 
MPSC without subsidy contract is 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) = 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑜) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑜]𝑞𝑜 =
2∆𝑚∆𝑜−∆𝑜
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
. 
The TSO’s profit in a MPSC without subsidy contract is 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) = 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑜) = [∆𝑜 −
(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞𝑜]𝑞𝑜 =
(𝛼𝑜−𝑐𝑜)
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
. Then, from (14), we get 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) − 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
−
2∆𝑚∆𝑜−∆𝑜
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
=
(∆𝑚−∆𝑜)(∆𝑚−5∆𝑜)
16(𝛽+𝛾)
. So, if ∆𝑚 − 5∆𝑜> 0, that is, ∆𝑚 − ∆𝑜> 4∆𝑜, then 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) >
𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓); if 0 < ∆𝑚 − ∆𝑜≤ 4∆𝑜 , then 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) ≤ 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓). From (15), we get 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) −
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑜
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
>
∆𝑜
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑜
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
= 0, then 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) > 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓). 
(ii) If ∆𝑚≤ ∆𝑜, then 𝑞𝑚
𝑓 ≤ 𝑞𝑜
𝑓
, that is, 𝑞𝑓 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑞𝑚, 𝑞𝑜) = 𝑞𝑚. Then MPM’s profit in 
a MPSC without subsidy contract is 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) = 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑚) = [∆𝑚 − (𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞
𝑚]𝑞𝑚 =
∆𝑚
2
4𝛽
. 
The TSO’s profit in a MPSC without subsidy contract is 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) = 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑚) = [∆𝑜 −
(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑞𝑚]𝑞𝑚 =
2∆𝑜∆𝑚−∆𝑚
2
4𝛽
. Then, from (14) we get 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) − 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑚
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
≥
∆𝑚
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
−
∆𝑚
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
= 0. So, 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) ≥ 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓). From (15), we get that 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) −
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) =
(∆𝑚+∆𝑜)
2
16(𝛽+𝛾)
−
2∆𝑜∆𝑚−∆𝑚
2
4(𝛽+𝛾)
=
(∆𝑜−∆𝑚)(∆𝑜−5∆𝑚)
16(𝛽+𝛾)
. So, if ∆𝑜 − 5∆𝑚> 0, that is, ∆𝑜 − ∆𝑚>
4∆𝑚, then 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) > 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓); if 0 ≤ ∆𝑜 − ∆𝑚≤ 4∆𝑚, then 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) ≤ 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓). 
Hence, if ∆𝑚 − ∆𝑜> 4∆𝑜 or ∆𝑜 − ∆𝑚> 4∆𝑚, then 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) > 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) and 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) >
𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓); if 0 < ∆𝑚 − ∆𝑜≤ 4∆𝑜 , then 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) ≤ 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓) and 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) ≥ 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓); if 0 ≤
∆𝑜 − ∆𝑚≤ 4∆𝑚, then 𝜋𝑜
𝑏(𝑞𝑏) ≤ 𝜋𝑜
𝑓(𝑞𝑓) and 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 (𝑞𝑏) ≥ 𝜋𝑚
𝑓 (𝑞𝑓). This completes the proof. 
